

distinction between dice-throws and resubmerging them in the void's virtual unity as a consistent ontological medium?

Conclusion: the stellar void punctures the cosmic animal

Let's conclude by recapitulating the basic philosophical parameters of the disagreement between Deleuze and Badiou on the question of the dice-throw. Badiou himself sums up the opposition by reinvoking Mallarmé, with whom he aligns himself here against the Nietzsche-Deleuze tandem. For Nietzsche-Deleuze 'Chance comes forth from the Infinite, which has been affirmed'; whereas for Mallarmé-Badiou, 'the Infinite issues forth from Chance, which has been denied'. What then are the philosophical consequences of this slight, yet nevertheless crucial alternation?

On the one hand we have the Deleuzian dice-throw as instance of anorganic vitalism. This dice-throw affirms the whole of chance in a single throw; it is the auto-affirmation of cosmic Chance as One-All in which the affirming 'I' is cracked and the thrower's identity dissolved. This is the dice-throw as vital figuration of the great cosmic animal. On the other hand, we have Badiou's dice-throw as index of the stellar *matheme*. This dice-throw is an undecidable subtraction separating an irreducibly singular configuration of the *alea*, and dissolving the cosmic unity of Chance in a gesture that simultaneously reaccentuates the void's untotalizable dispersion and crystallizes the Subject. This is the dice-throw as *mathematical* quantification of the stellar void. So we seem to be confronted with an insuperable conflict of philosophical interest: the event as subjective destitution versus the event as subjective constitution; the event as auto-affirmation of the One-All versus the event as puncturing subtraction from the One and dissemination of the All; a manifold of actual chances coinciding in the sovereign necessity of Chance as a virtual whole versus a plurality of separate and incommensurable chances subtended by the hazard of an infinitely empty void. And the conflict effectively remains insuperable or undecidable until a decision is forced. But perhaps the ability to decide in favour of the undecidable is precisely what separates subtractive intervention from purified affirmation; in which case the quantification of the stellar void punctures the qualitative unity of the cosmic animal.

Who Dwells? Heidegger and the Place of Mortal Subjects

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I.

What is it to inhabit? What is to inhabit the architectural? Once questions of this type are given their full rein, then what appears within them is an attempt to think that which is essential to dwelling. From one perspective, announced within such questions is philosophy's relation to the built, and therefore to architecture. Once philosophy is linked to the project of discovering or rediscovering the essential, then the object - here architecture, though equally it could have been the work of art - is that which occasions that project. At one extreme it could be argued that the object stages the essential and to that extent allows for its incorporation into philosophy. While it will, in the end, be necessary to develop a critical relation to such a conception of the object and therefore of such a conception of the philosophical, at this stage these two positions need to be worked through. Only by working through them and thus by allowing, if only initially, for an interarticulation of philosophy and the essential, will it become possible to free philosophy from a simple identification with a concern for the essential. In working through that initial formulation which, firstly links philosophy and the essential while secondly construing the object in terms of its being the occasion for that interarticulation, it becomes possible to distance such a conception of the philosophical. The distancing from the essence brings with it a philosophical concern with the materiality of the object and thus another philosophical project. Once that stage is reached then the concern would be with how the object's materiality were to be thought philosophically.¹

¹ The project here is not with this additional task but with detailing that interarticulation of philosophy, a thinking of the essence and architecture (where the

Here however, what needs to be taken up is the interarticulation of philosophy with a concern for the essence, and with architecture understood as the locus of dwelling.

Heidegger gives this set up - the determining place of the essential - the following form:

Man's relation to locales and through locales to spaces, inheres in his dwelling. The relationship between man and space is none other than dwelling thought essentially (*das wesentlich gedachte Wohnen*). (359/152)

What has to be pursued in this context is how this formulation of essential thinking is to be understood. Part of that process will have to maintain dwelling as a question while demanding of the essential that it be subject to its own sustained questioning. Careful attention must be paid to Heidegger's actual formulation. The location of "man" - Heidegger's "man", the "man" situated here as "in his dwelling" - cannot be separated from the effective presence of the essential. The essence opens up and operates in the space held by this "man's" relations. In other words, the insistence of the subject - even if the conception of subject is yet to be made precise - is already found in the "relation" (*Das Verhältnis*) between "man" and "space". This relation - a relation given by its constitutive elements - is that which gives rise to the essential within dwelling. This has a direct consequence. What it means is that the

latter is understood as the site of dwelling) that emerges in Heidegger's 'Building, Dwelling, Thinking'. References to this text which will be given in the body of the paper are to the English and then to the German publication i.e. Martin Heidegger, *Basic Writings* (BW), edited and translated by David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1993), pp. 347-363; *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Neske), pp. 139-157. (References to other texts translated in *Basic Writings* - BW - will also be given in the body of the paper.) This text has attracted an enormous literature of its own. The most recent and most favourable account is Karsten Harries, *The Ethical Function of Architecture* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997). Harries's project is Heideggerian in orientation. The section that is central is Chapter 10. I have referred to other texts by Heidegger when and if necessary. (References are, for the most part, to the Gesamtausgabe. (GA plus volume number) Vittorio Klostermann. Frankfurt.) Clearly, as soon as a term such as *Vergessenheit* occurs then on one level it needs to be situated within the larger corpus. However the strategy here is to trace the movement of one text and thus not to generalise outside the context of a study of the issues raised by 'Building, Dwelling, Thinking'.

question of the subject, and with it of subjectivity, cannot be avoided.² From the very start there is a positioning of "man". Not only is "man" present, but the way in which it is present occasions access to the essential. One is bound up with the other. The interplay of these positions as articulated in the text and therefore as constitutive of Heidegger's project, open up another spacing. Not only is there the spacing of relations within the text, but there is also the constitutive moment already noted in which the presence of that which is essential is held in place by a founding relation between "man" and "space". This founding relation is a spacing that is prior to "space"; in other words, it is prior to the text's actual formulation of spacing. Giving an account both of this spacing and its effects is an integral part of any analysis of the text as well as its implicit commitments and expectations.

Heidegger's 'Building, Dwelling, Thinking' opens a specific philosophical remit. What occurs in its opening is a move away from the materiality of the built, if this were to be thought as an end in itself, and towards another possibility. The move is presented in terms of a specific strategy. There is another enterprise which involves a different take on building; one determined by a specific philosophical undertaking. Heidegger's description of the procedure is precise (Its detail must be noted and followed):

This venture in thought [...] traces buildings back into that domain to which everything that *is* belongs (*Dieser Denkversuch [...] er verfolgt das Bauen in den jenigen Bereich zurück, wohin jegliches gehört, was ist*). (347/139)

Only by opening up the necessity for such a manoeuvre, and thus by in some sense maintaining it, can Heidegger's own complex reworking of the triumvirate *building, dwelling, thinking* be understood. Even before pursuing the detail of these three terms the use of the formulation "tracing

² Part of the project of this paper is to trace the conception and role of the subject within Heidegger's text. This does not mean that it is only the references to "man" or the "human" that are of interest. More specifically what is of concern is the way that there is an implicit conception and role of the subject within the text. This implicit presence - which has explicit consequences - will be addressed, in part, in terms of the conception of identity that such a conception demands for itself. I have attempted to deal with this general conception of subject-identity in a number of places. See in particular, 'Figuring self-identity: Blanchot's Bataille', in Juliet Steyn, ed., *Other the Identity: The Subject, Politics and Art* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997).

back" (*zurückverfolgen*) should be noted. Not because it may harbour a latent nostalgia, but because it provides the link to that which forms the basis of the investigation, namely, "that domain in which everything that *is* belongs." With the evocation of this "domain" (*Bereich*) two questions immediately arise.

The first question pertains to the implicit temporality at work in the movement of a tracing back to a "domain" that provides what will here be called the founding propriety of the question of existence.³ Expressed in this way what is central - indeed what will have always been central - is the question of existence itself. (The question of Being). The second question relates to the nature of the domain. What are the contours of such a domain? What would its cartography come to map? Maps, domains and places are therefore already involved. As has been indicated it is as though the basis for any consideration of dwelling and spacing has already been mapped out. The question that arises therefore concerns the relation between this mapping and the way dwelling and spacing appear within it. Spacing has already been given an important doubling within the work of the text; one that opens up once it is recognised, not simply as a textual moment but as part of the presentation of a specific conception of the philosophical. In addition to this doubling having a determining effect on the presentation of Heidegger's project as well as on the way that project is to be understood, there is a further element at work and which plays a similar role. This element is not just the presence of a certain conception of the time of writing - the present - more significantly it is one which has a determining effect on the nature and the form of the philosophical task.⁴

Heidegger's formulation of the philosophical and the task of philosophy are bound up with a specific conception of the present. Indeed, he will distinguish between a conception of the present that reduces the time of writing to a simple identification with dates and thus

³ Throughout this paper, terms such as "proper", "propriety", "properly" etc., will continue to be used. Their presence is a way of intruding a certain Heideggerian motif of thought into the text in order then to develop a critical engagement with it. The justification for so doing arises from passages such as the one just cited. When Heidegger claims that there is a possible movement to a "domain" in which what is belongs, he cannot be interpreted as making an arbitrary claim, as though this were one possibility amongst a range of others. The claim is that any consideration of what is, has to consider that which is in terms proper to existence. Anything else is simply to misunderstand how the philosophical question of existence - the question of Being - is to be understood.

⁴ I have dealt with the way this works in Heidegger's project in much greater detail in my *Present Hope* (London: Routledge, 1997). See in particular Chapter 2.

with chronological time, and one which construes the present in terms of a specific epoch. This latter conception - the epochal present - is deployed by Heidegger when he distinguishes between a housing shortage and a sense of homelessness that pertains to the being of being human. The former is thought within the temporality of the every day while the latter becomes the description of the epochal present. This way of understanding the present has an effect on how the philosophical task is to be understood and therefore is to be acted out. There is an ineliminable reciprocity between time and task.

II.

What has been suggested at the very opening of Heidegger's text is that "dwelling" and "building" demand to be thought in terms of the propriety of the question of Being. Without the acceptance of this as the point of departure Heidegger's undertaking would founder. It would be, almost literally, without philosophical foundations. This is not to deny the particularity of architecture nor the specificity of the built. Rather, it is to suggest that it is only in terms of this tracing back, the affirmed return to the place and source of propriety, that it becomes possible, for Heidegger, to ask fundamental questions about building and then, in having asked them, to take up the built. The presence of the built - the actuality of architecture - cannot be thought outside the confines delimited by the question of Being. An aesthetics or ethics of the built would simply fail to address that which was proper to the built. As has already been indicated central to this movement is "man"; the man of "man's dwelling". At work here therefore is a complex interarticulation of the subject; the question of Being; a temporal movement of unfolding that determines the nature of the philosophical project; and then finally the effect that the conception of the present has on that project. Perhaps there is, more than an interarticulation, a reciprocity of dependence.

The opening of the text calls for an orientation to "building" and "dwelling" that situates both as belonging to Being. This is their proper situation. It is thus possible to ask questions concerning "building" and "dwelling" that work within, and more emphatically, are constrained to work within, this orientation. Nonetheless, Heidegger begins with the commonplace, with what, in this context, can be given the quality of the everyday. This is not an inappropriate point of departure since it is with the everyday, with the general assumptions and the hasty identifications of building and materiality, that a sense of propriety is to be located. The

temporality of the proper needs to be noted. It is futural in a precise sense. The recognition of the proper is of a founding propriety and thus it is the recognition of that which had already been there. In the future that which is always already "older" will be recognised. The present site of this process is comprised of the misidentifications marking the everyday. The opening up of misidentifications becomes therefore the location of what Heidegger describes as the "essential"; i.e. an already present interrelation between dwelling and building. Going from the everyday to that which can be attributed the status of a founding propriety reiterates the position already noted in the earlier passage which was there formulated in terms of a "tracing back".

In the opening two pages of the text Heidegger moves backwards and forwards between possible identifications of building and dwelling. In each case there is the evocation of human existence; "the truck driver", "the working woman". These people are taken as being housed in their places of work even though they do not dwell within them. Dwelling would only be possible in this sense if, to use Heidegger's formulation, "dwell means solely to have our lodgings in them" (348/140). The point of initially endorsing the possible identification - perhaps reduction - of dwelling to lodging is to use it as the basis for then going on to argue for its impossibility. The impossibility emerges, as will be shown, because of the primordial interrelatedness of "building" and "dwelling". An interrelatedness that must exist therefore beyond the purview of means and function (or, to be more exact, beyond the purview of a straightforwardly functionalist conception of function). As such it will always have been present prior to that identification of dwelling and lodging which misstates that which is proper to dwelling. Uncovering the relation between dwelling and building involves a recognition that there has been a shift in Heidegger's use of terms. He presents it as involving the following considerations:

those buildings that are not dwelling places remain in turn determined by dwelling insofar as they serve man's dwelling (*dem Wohnen der Menschen*). (348/140)

As the passage makes clear dwelling is already possessed. Here it does not exist in itself. What is involved is "man's dwelling".⁵ The possessive

⁵ For a detailed discussion of the complex position of "dwelling" within Heidegger's larger corpus and the way in which dwelling is linked to poetry and the more general

is important. Ineliminable questions arise with it. Who possesses? Who is the man in question? While recognising the problems already apparent in any use of this term, it remains the case that what is announced in Heidegger's formulation is neither the specificity of human existence, one practice as opposed to another, nor the differences that are, on one level, constitutive of human existence. More is at stake. What is announced is human existence formulated in terms of that which is proper to being human. The propriety in question can be identified therefore as pertaining to the being of being human. It is this being, the being posed within Heidegger's own construal of ontological difference which has already been announced, perhaps named in *Being and Time* as *Dasein*.

There is, therefore, a different type of questioning that has to take place. The expression "man's dwelling" contains an important opening within it. An opening leading from factual specificity towards the being of being human. It is, of course, an opening mirroring the move away from simple lodging, the built as such, and towards another questioning of what will already have been implicated in building and dwelling. The already present quality denied in the misidentifications even if such misidentifications are in the gift of Being.

Heidegger opens his account of this other questioning with the claim that not only are building and dwelling already implicated, one in the other, but that their essentiality, and thus by extension their reciprocal implications, are themselves already there in language; already there, that is, as announced in the words - "building", "dwelling" - themselves. What is announced, however, has been obscured. Even though it will mean moving ahead in the text it is worthwhile pursuing this particular point. Obscuring is not just any motif in Heidegger's texts.

With the presence of obscuring what comes to be announced is the present. In other words, what is announced is that conception of the present that has a determining role in the organisation of the philosophical task. At a later point in this text what emerges is a confrontation with the presence of homelessness, and without taking up here what is meant by the "proper plight of dwelling", it is still vital to recognise that Heidegger forges an important distinction between two forms of homelessness. It should be noted, however, that the use of the term "plight" (*die Not*) already gives rise to the demand for a type of rescue or redemption. Moreover there is an important differentiation that is being staged here between the "plight of dwelling" (*Not des Wohnens*)

question of authentic existence, see Werner Marx, *Heidegger and the Tradition* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971), pp. 233-241.

and what is identified in the text as "today's housing shortage" (*der heutigen Wohnungsnot*). As will emerge, this later formulation, even though it names the "day" - it is today's housing shortage - fails, in Heidegger's terms, to think the specificity of the day and thus to think the present as the gift - additionally, in the gift - of Being. The distinction between these two senses of the present - one that is the present of the "today" of the above passage and the other sense of the present as the site of the "plight of dwelling" - pertains to the primordial spacing identified above.⁶

However hard and bitter, however hampering and threatening the lack of houses remains, the proper plight of dwelling (*eigentliche Not des Wohnens*) does not lie merely in the lack of houses. The proper plight of dwelling is indeed older (*alter*) than the world wars with their destruction, older also than the increase of the earth's population and the condition of the industrial workers. (363/156)

⁶ There is of course a complication that occurs at this precise point; a complication that is integral to the force of Heidegger's general argument. There is a sense of homelessness that is literal. The absence of homes that marked the Germany of the 1950s and now the absence of homes for a percentage of the urban poor are the expression of this literal homelessness. There is a further sense of homelessness that is the "plight of our dwelling". There is however a third sense in which "we" as "historical Dasein" are unaware that this is "our" plight. In this final instance "we" are estranged from our condition of being estranged. This complex set up is one that not only depends upon a conception of the present as marked by "indifference (*Gelichgültigkeit*) to Being" (a formulation used by Heidegger in his Nietzsche book and which I have discussed in *Present Hope*) but it must also be one where this indifference is not recognised as such. (For another interpretation of "indifference" as a "mood" see Michel Haar, 'Empty Time and Indifference to Being', in James Risser, ed., *Heidegger towards the Turn* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999), pp. 295-319) Here the subject of misrecognition is not the individual person but historical Dasein and thus a people. At this point philosophy and culture touch. While philosophy must have the thinking and perhaps the overcoming of this "indifference" as its task, precisely because the "indifference" defines the age, it can only ever be finally overcome by those interventions within and as culture stemming from the founding propriety of that which is essential. Here, of course, culture, philosophy and politics combine. There can be no easy separation of one from the other. This point is clearly demonstrated in the discussion of "essential homelessness of man" (*der wesenhaften Heimatlosigkeit des Menschen*) in the 'Letter on Humanism' (GA 9, p. 341; BW, p. 244). Arguments concerning the nature of Europe call on a thinking of the political that, from Heidegger's perspective, is still to take place.

While it will be necessary to return to the detail and with it to the conclusion of this passage the important element to note at this stage is the way in which what could be described as everyday concerns - the insistence of the ordinary - are displaced in terms of that which has a more fundamental sense of propriety. (A state of affairs marked out in the above by the use of the term "*eigentliche*".) An integral part of this move is that the conditions of people at work, overpopulation, actual homelessness are all equated. Their particularity is either denied or effaced while, at the same time, they are relegated to the status of being irrelevant in comparison to that mode of questioning demanded by the presence of a singular founding propriety.⁷

There are two levels of activity and specificity. As such therefore the identification of dwelling with lodging would be to confuse these two levels. And yet this confusion is not an occurrence arising by chance. In taking place it works to define the nature of the present. It delimits that age in which "we" - for Heidegger "we mortals" - dwell. Dwelling is metaphysical. The everyday is the gift of Being. The consequence of this is that overcoming this conflation or identification - recognising therefore that it is necessarily a misidentification - delimits the nature of the philosophical task. More dramatically it sets the stage for the activity of culture and thus of the projected reorientation of culture through politics.⁸

The evocation of propriety takes place within that particular setting of the everyday which can be taken as defining the present. Again, it is the precise nature of the present that demands that it be differentiated from itself. The necessity for this movement - one stemming from a particular recognition - is due to the impossibility of there being an experience of that which will have been there most properly. Holding to the determining centrality of the present - a site which is itself given by the ineliminable presence of a founding propriety - it becomes possible to return to the detail of Heidegger's own position. What is at work now is the positioning of "man", Heidegger's "man"; the subject that inhabits. The location of this subject, and more importantly, the relation in which the subject is given are both positioned by the spacing prior to the introduction of space. The spacing opened up by the relationship between

⁷ It is thus that error can be linked to wandering; 7 of *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* announces this set up in its actual title *Die Un-wahrheit als die Irre*. GA 9, p. 196.

⁸ For a nuanced and cogently argued reading of 'Building, Dwelling, Thinking' that emphasises the inherent "political" implications and presuppositions of the text see J. Hillis Miller, 'Slipping Vaulting Crossing: Heidegger', in his *Topographies* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), pp. 216-255.

Being and beings is the space in which the question of space and thus spacing is itself posed.

Overcoming the obscuring of that which had been announced in the words "building" and "dwelling" necessitates returning to the words themselves and thus to that which is said within them. (It is not difficult to see that what is at work here is the same structure of differentiation between the everyday and that which has a founding propriety that has already been noted.) This recourse to language is described in a much later paper 'Art and Space' as an "emergency path" (*einen Notsteg*);⁹ a move whose justification lies in language's ability to harbour the essential. There are two elements of Heidegger's analysis of the Old High German work "*bauen*", (to build) that have to be noted. In the first place it meant "To stay in place" and thus to dwell. Secondly however its "proper meaning ... has been lost to us". (*Die eigentliche Bedeutung ... ist uns verlorengegangen.*) (348/140) And yet traces of this original propriety remain. Part of the presentation of this argument involves the location of the interrelation between building, dwelling and neighbour; an interrelation that is already being spoken, no matter how obscurely, in language's work, though more exactly in language's proper work. This relationship is however transformed by the link between dwelling and human existence. For Heidegger the reach of *bauen* (to build) "in its original sense" (*ursprünglich spricht*) (349/141) moves to *bin*; in other words to *ich bin* and *du bist* which in this context entails, for Heidegger, that fundamental to the being of being human is dwelling. The interplay is both of one and the other and therefore of the saying of one within the other.

What is being referred to here is that which is there essentially in the words once their original hold and thus their proper meaning is able to determine what is taking place. This set up is given and allowed by that which has already been announced with, thus within, language. The task involves the possibility of that experience of what will have already been said. It is there in "the older word *bauen*" ("*Das alte Wort bauen*". (349/141)) This quality of already having been said cannot be thought other than in relation to the strategy that demands a "tracing back". What has been referred to above as an implicit spacing that structures the formulation of spacing is clearly evident here. (Addressing the question

⁹ 'Art and Space', GA 13, pp. 203-211, here p. 206. The most sustained attempt to offer an interpretation whose aim was to integrate this text into Heidegger's general consideration of art is provided by Gianni Vattimo in his 'Ornament/Monument' in *The End Of Modernity*, translated by Jon R. Snyder (Oxford: Polity Press, 1988), pp. 79-89.

of the temporality at work in the term "older" would be already to take up this insistent and already present spacing.) There is an in-built and assumed distinction between that which is given and the presence within it of the obscured though nonetheless already present sense of the 'word's' founding propriety. The spacing that holds the distinction in place and which is announced and which will continue to be announced by the use of the term "*alte*" is that which is assumed as well as that which allows the process of tracing back to be effective. What it stages is an uncovering of what was already there. That which is uncovered is the founding propriety.

Heidegger formulates the complex interrelations between being and dwelling thus:

The way in which you are and I am, the manner in which humans are on the earth, is *baun* dwelling. To be a human being/man means to be on the earth as a mortal. It means to dwell.¹⁰ (349/141)

The analysis continues by evoking, again, "*Das alte Wort bauen*" and then by going on to link it to care and preservation; a link established by the work of the "older word". Building (*baun*) in this sense, namely a building that stages what Heidegger describes as "a nurturing and a caring" does not involve either the thought or the practice of ends and means even though it may lead to them. Even that type of building in which a form of activity is envisaged - Heidegger's examples are "temple building" and "ship building" - may be linked to dwelling. However what occurs is that cultivating and constructing come to be identified with building. More than that the actual "matter of building" (*die Sache des Bauens*) come to be located solely within these activities. The consequence of this identification, this particular laying hold to the name of building, is that for Heidegger the "... proper sense of *bauen*, (*eigentliche Sinn des Bauens*) namely dwelling, falls into oblivion (*Vergessenheit*)". This fall is of course linked to the strategies that have already been identified; indeed they are unthinkable as effective strategies without the necessary presence of this fall. Again, "building and dwelling" become part of the everyday and what is essential slips away with the insistence of the day. The time of the "everyday" is the time of "today"; the "today" of "today's housing shortage".

¹⁰ In this instance the German measures the pace of the last sentence: "*Menschen sein heißt: als Sterblicher auf der Erde sein, heißt: wohnen*" (p. 141).

Avoiding the hold of this fall - an avoiding that is the task opened and thus demanded by this particular construal of the present - means returning to language. In this context, that means listening to what is being said in the word *Bauen*. It is worthwhile noting what Heidegger identifies as a consequence of this hearing. In the first place it is that building is most properly "dwelling"; as "dwelling" building is therefore most properly itself. The second consequence is that dwelling pertains to the way in which human beings - identified in this text as "mortals" - "are on the earth". And finally that building understood as dwelling "... unfolds into the building that cultivates growing things and the building that erects buildings" (350/142). A great deal of the rest of the text becomes a detailed working through of the three moments emerging from listening to that which is said in the essence of the word "*bauen*". In each instance there is a further attempt to allow for the presence of the essential to determine what it is that is there to be understood. Inevitably the "emergency path" is taken.

III.

Taking up dwelling is, once again, occasioned by listening to language. What is heard - perhaps what needs to be heard - is in response to the question "... in what does the essence of dwelling consist?" (*das Wesen des Wohens?*) Within the word there resounds a series of connections that draw "peace", "remaining in peace", "being free" and "sparing" into the work of the word. Dwelling moves to the place of sparing. This latter term for Heidegger needs to be thought outside that semantic frame given by a conception of sparing defined negatively; i.e. as not doing something. As he argues:

Real sparing (*Das eigentliche Schonen*) is something positive and takes place when we leave something before hand in its own essence (*in seinem Wesen*), when we return it (*zurückbergen*) specifically to its essential being (*in sein Wesen*), when we "free" it in the proper sense of the word into a preserve of peace. [...] The fundamental character of dwelling is this sparing. (351/143)

Occurring within this formulation is the distinction between "real sparing" and another less authentic sparing. A distinction that is articulated within and as the primordial spacing that governs the Heideggerian project; i.e. the distinction between the actual and the

everyday and that which is "real" or proper and which is not actualised as such but to which or at least in relation to which it is possible to return. Without moving through every stage of the development of this position, it opens up to incorporate what Heidegger calls the "fourfold".¹¹ It arises out of the claim that dwelling is the "stay of mortals on the earth". The earth brings with it the sky. With both are brought the divinities. Earth, sky, mortals, and divinities have a oneness in the fourfold. Human beings dwell in that they spare "the fourfold in its essential unfolding". What this means is that dwelling - once thought essentially - allows the sky to be present as itself. The earth is allowed to be as it is. Equally with divinities and with mortals, all are allowed to be as they are; as they are essentially. The allowing of the fourfold opens up the relationship to objects. There is an important two part move made by Heidegger at the point. It is vital to trace the detail of Heidegger's actual formulation of this move:

Dwelling preserves the fourfold by bringing the essence of the fourfold into things. But things themselves secure the fourfold only when they themselves as things are let be in their essence. (*wenn sie selbst als Dinge in ihrem Wesen gelassen werden*). How does this happen? In this way, that mortals nurse and nurture the things that grow, and specially construct things that do not grow. Cultivating and construction are building in the narrow sense. Dwelling, in as much as it keeps the fourfold in things, is, as this keeping, building. (353/146)

There are two elements that occur in this passage and which must be noted. In the first instance there is the claim that the fourfold is present in things and that this is occasioned by dwelling. In other words, that the dwelling occasions the preserving of the fourfold by the thing's opening up that particular setting in which the fourfold comes to be present as it is: present as what Heidegger has already referred to as "the simple oneness of the four". However, the second element complicates this set up. Here it is claimed that this is only possible if things are "as things let be in their essence" (*als Dinge in ihrem Wesen gelassen werden*). While a central question posed by this formulation is what is meant by "letting be", it must be recognised that its force as a question lies in the possibility that there is a quality of a thing that is essential to its being what it is; not a particular, rather a particular as thing. What needs to be noted here is

¹¹ For a more detailed elucidation of this term see Joan Stambaugh, *The Finitude of Being* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992), pp. 83-103.

that there is a move from the thing as substance and thus as a static entity to its having an active quality. The being in question is the thing's being as that thing. Even though it is necessary to use the word "as", it should not be thought there is any distinction between 'being' and 'being as' at work in this formulation of the move from the static to the active.

In a text of the same period, *What is a Thing?*, Heidegger, addresses the question of the essential quality of the thing - remembering that what is at stake here is in one sense things - by reference to a jug:¹²

The jug is a thing neither in the sense of the Roman *res*, nor in the sense of the mediaeval *ens*, let alone in the modern sense of object. The jug is a thing insofar as it things. (*Der Krug ist ein Ding, insofern er dingt*). The presence of something such as the jug comes into its own, appropriatively manifests and determines itself, only from the thinging. (170)

The jug therefore is a thing to the extent that it enacts its being as a jug. Another way of putting this would be to argue that it is, is what it is, in the continuity of its being as a jug. However, this is not to be understood as a simple quality of the object. Rather the jug is itself by being within that set up in which its being as a jug is able to become itself. The identification of the thingly quality of the jug with its existence as an object - and therefore as having utility only insofar as it is an object - would be to misstate that which is involved in a thing's being what it is. The jug is not in a certain place. It is rather that the thingly quality of the jug places it due to there being a place for its being as a jug. The jug is let be. Letting be becomes the way for there to be the presence of that which is proper to something being what it is.¹³

¹² Martin Heidegger, *What is a Thing?*, translated by W. B. Barton Jr and Vera Deutsch (Chicago: Henry Regency Company, 1967).

¹³ While having to use the term "something" only compounds the problem of stating what is at work within the process of "letting be", another way of interpreting what is involved is to view it as a way of accounting for the identity of a given particular. The way in which a particular jug is a jug is not in terms of its partaking of the concept or idea of a jug nor is it a jug insofar as it is recognised under the general heading of the abstract concept 'jug'. A jug is what it is insofar as it is as a jug. In other words, insofar as it is able to realise that which is proper to its being what it is. Now while there may be a case in arguing that there is something proper to a jug being a jug and even assuming the viability of an argument that was not advanced in terms of simple utility, the question that remains open at this stage concerns the extent to which there is something proper to the being of being human and moreover

In a more generalised sense "letting be" is an experiential possibility in which a particular set up occasions a realisation of the fourfold as the fourfold. The thingly nature of the thing emerges to the extent that it is able to be experienced as allowing for the presence of the fourfold. In the context of 'Building, Dwelling, Thinking' this is what is meant by building. It must be noted, of course, that letting be, in the case of Heidegger, is itself unthinkable outside its relation to and thus retention of the essential.¹⁴ Pursuing the question of building - pursuing it in terms of dwelling - comes to be linked to the built in terms of the built being a "built thing" (*ein gebautes Ding*). (146) Here the "built thing" - and it is as thing that it must show its thingly quality - is given in the example of a bridge.¹⁵

With the bridge, it is vital that it exists in such a way that it is able to hold its own relation with the fourfold by providing for that relation. The bridge must be itself. In Heidegger's terms the bridge "gathers to itself in its own way earth and sky, divinities and mortals." (355). Here this "gathering" is what the bridge is when its thingly quality comes to the fore.¹⁶ With this movement the bridge can no longer be taken either as symbolising or expressing. "The bridge is a thing and only that". (355) Part of Heidegger's argument depends upon his longer meditation on the question of the "thing".¹⁷

An opening presents itself here, thus it is worthwhile taking up the way Heidegger formulates what he identifies as the inability of Western

whether that sense of propriety can be accounted for, or even explicated in terms of dwelling. Dwelling can, of course, be subject to a similar type of questioning.

¹⁴ There is an important move that could be traced within Heidegger's thought from the formulation of "letting be" and "being free for" in *Being and Time*, translated John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978); *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1979.) sections 72-72 - and the latter linkage of "thinking" to "*Gelassenheit*" in *Gelassenheit* (Tübingen: Verlag Günther Neske, 1959).

¹⁵ For an extraordinary analysis of bridges and of this specific bridge in Heidegger see Johannes Fritsche, 'On Brinks and Bridges in Heidegger', *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (1995).

¹⁶ The term "gathering" (*Sammlung*) and its various cognates play a fundamental role in Heidegger's work. It is a term that would need to be pursued in detail in any account of the way in which oblivion or forgetfulness constructs and implies a particular conception of self-identity. For intimations as to some of the issues involved see William McNeill, *The Glimpse of the Eye* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999), in particular the discussion on pp. 278-9.

¹⁷ From, at least, the 1935-6 lecture course give at Freiburg on the "Basic Questions of Metaphysics" to his writings of the 1950s, the question of what it is that a thing is endures.

thought to pose with any precision, let alone pursue, the question of the thing. The importance of the formulation furnished by Heidegger is that it provides an insight into the implicit conception of time that orchestrates his inquiry. In addition, it will indicate the way in which the initial spacing that governs this undertaking is there in the opening, the presenting, of the bridge:

Our thinking has of course long been accustomed to understate the essence of the thing. The consequence, in the course of Western thought, has been that the thing is represented as an unknown X to which perceptible properties are attached. From this point of view every thing that already belongs to the gathering essence of this thing does, of course, appear as something that is afterwards (*nachträglich*) read into it. Yet the bridge would never be a mere bridge if it were not a thing. (355/148)

The argument advanced by Heidegger in this passage starts with the claim - one which will be shown to be inadequate - that what is entailed in being a thing involves a shift in orientation from the unknown to the known via the addition of "properties". The immediate problem with such a position is that the question of what it means for a thing to be what it is will have been excluded from consideration. Presented in this light what can be said of a thing appears as though it were a retroactive attribution. However, for the bridge to have the qualities that it does; for it to gather "the earth as landscape around the stream"; for it to let "the stream run its course and at the same time grant mortals their way"; for it to initiate "the lingering and hastening ways of men to and fro"; for it to gather "as a passage that crosses before the divinities", it must be itself. It must be as a thing. The "gathering essence" is not taken as primary. It is only allocated a presence that is there after the event; *après coup*. To the extent that this retrospective attribution - a semantic afterwardsness - is given its place, it is as though the thing were devoid of a founding possibility. Part of avoiding the hold of the retroactive involves the recognition that there is a founding and thus original quality. This quality is there in the bridge's gathering, in the thingly quality of the bridge and thus it must be attributed a primordality that eschews retroactive addition.

The contrast between the primordial and the retroactive is not a simple opposition. It is positioned against expression and representation insofar as what is being claimed is that there is an original set up. There can be no interpretive movement across time that would enable the real character of the thing to be shown; either by being brought out or by being

adduced. Its real character is shown in its being itself. This will be the object of experience. In other words, it is this primordial quality which must be experienced. It must be heard. It must be that for which we are - or will be - free.

At this precise point it becomes possible to establish what for Heidegger would have to be the fundamental difference between the task of "tracing back" and the activity that would involve a retroactive attribution. The difference between them is of fundamental importance. The former depends upon the original spacing in which what founds propriety - the founding propriety - is itself maintained. The latter, on the other hand, implies that the attribution of meaning and thus significance occurs in a transformative reiteration of the 'founding' moment. It would be an act of constitution that precluded the possibility of there being a founding propriety that had to be maintained as itself. What is being excluded, by Heidegger, is not just a conception of repetition but an implicit questioning of the possibility that there is only one "domain" to which "everything that is belongs".

The "gathering essence" that is identified in the initial presentation above, and which attempts to exclude the retroactive is taken a step further with the introduction of space:

The bridge is a thing: it gathers the fourfold, but in such a way that it allows a site for the fourfold. By this site are determined the places and paths by which a space is provided for. (356/148)

Space, while allowed for, is itself an allowing. In his short text 'Art and Space', in the move from Space (*Raum*) to Spacing/Clearing-away (*Räumen*), in privileging of the verb in the place of the noun, Heidegger gives space an active quality. Spacing in this sense,

Brings forth the free, the openness of man's settling and dwelling. When thought in its own special character spacing/clearing away is the release of spaces towards which the fate of dwelling man (*die Schicksale des wohnenden Menschen*) turns in the preserve of the home or in the broken homelessness or in complete indifference to the two [...] spacing/clearing-way brings forth locality preparing for dwelling [...] Spacing/clearing-away is the release of spaces. (206-7)

With spacing and thus with space "man" will have been introduced. Not only will "man" name that which stays "within the fourfold among

things", there is a more fundamental relation which can be located in the movement between "man" and "mortals":

Spaces open up by the fact that they are let into the dwelling of man. To say that mortals are is to say that in dwelling they persist through spaces by virtue of their stay among things and locales. (359/152)

While it will mean staying with the hold of the text, Heidegger's next move is a great importance and must be noted. Its significance is twofold. In the first place Heidegger introduces a shift in which it is possible to go from "mortals" to "I". In the second he introduces the body (*Leib*). Heidegger describes human activity as sustaining space. It is a sustaining because activity means that we "stay near and remote from locales and things". The example given in the text occurs at the point where both the "I" and the body intrude:

When I go toward the door of the lecture hall, I am already there, and I could not go to it at all if it were not such that I am there. I am never here only, as the encapsulated body; rather I am there, that is, I already pervade the space of the room, and only thus can I go through it. (359/152)

This formulation needs to be understood as an attempt to position the relationship between the subject and space beyond the hold of that set up which delivers the subject as in space; with such a position the subject as already encapsulated in its body would be, in virtue of that position, in space. What is being suggested here, by Heidegger, in a move that can be read as an attempt to halt the possibility of a simple phenomenology, is that the subject is already in space in the precise sense that the subject 'is' - is what it is - in allowing.¹⁸ The subject is in its allowing for a spacing in which it finds itself. Part of the import of this is the fundamental demand that it makes. What is necessary as a consequences is what could be

¹⁸ The problem of the relationship between phenomenology and ontology cannot be addressed adequately here. Nonetheless it is worth recalling Heidegger's opening remarks in *Being and Time* in 7. Here Heidegger describes philosophy as a "universal phenomenological ontology". In defining Dasein as historical - even accepting that the sense of historical will be the subject of a detailed investigation in the body of the text - the problem is always going to concern how the relationship between the subject of a historical ontology is going to relate to the subject of a phenomenology. This problem will endure throughout Heidegger's project.

described as an experiential awareness. The subject must become aware of itself as primordially in this position. The subject must experience that which is its ownmost (*eigen*) most fundamentally; namely the primordial interarticulation of dwelling and being. The problem of experience - though perhaps more accurately the problem of the absence of experience and its accompanying forms of misrecognition - are fundamental to Heidegger's own project.¹⁹ And yet there is something else at work here. With this positioning of the subject what remains unquestioned is the subject, its body and space.

The body does not just emerge. Present in the text is the move from "mortals" to "I". The body comes to the fore within that relation and only within that relation. To that extent there would seem to be something odd in the claim that the subject, its body and space remain unquestioned. After all, is it not the case that Heidegger both in 'Building, Dwelling, Thinking' and 'Art and Space' tried to exhibit the "special character" of space? The importance of this question is that the answer that comes to be given is that space is that which is given by and for the subject. What however is the quality of this space? What is the space of the lecture hall? How is the space of bodies and the positioning of bodies to be understood? What are the relations that take place? The same type of questioning will pertain in regards to the subject. In other words, even in accepting Heidegger's description what has to be accepted in addition is that spacing is neutral and that the man in question - the one who dwells - brings with him this neutrality. It is this point that has to be developed.

IV.

In a way that reiterates what has already emerged concerning "letting be", the essential within building is identified by Heidegger in terms of the process of "letting dwell". After having made this point it is then taken a

¹⁹ Once again the detail of this point cannot be pursued, nonetheless the point at issue can be addressed in terms of the necessary presence of the complex forms of recognition and/or experience demanded by the different senses of "homelessness;" and thus of the "plight" of "man". Inherent in the formulation of "our" plight is the necessity of coming to recognise that this a predicament that is properly "ours". What cannot be denied is the necessity of having to give some type of description of who "we" are. The problem is that this subject - the we of who "we" are - is thought and presented within the primordial sense of spacing already identified. As such what cannot be enacted in any straightforward way is the move from "we" to "I". It is this point that has to be argued.

step further. Almost as an act of clarification another example is introduced.

The essence of building is letting dwell (*das Wohnenlassen*). Building accomplishes its essential process in the raising of locales by the joining of their spaces. *Only if we are capable of dwelling, only then can we build.* Let us think for a while of a farmhouse in the Black Forest, which was built some two hundred years ago by the dwelling of peasants. Here the self-sufficiency of the power to let earth and sky, divinities and mortals enter into simple oneness into things ordered in the house. (361-2/154-5; emphasis in the original)

Heidegger is quick to point out that there is no suggestion that today there should be any attempt to return to this state of affairs. It is impossible for modern man to live in this way. Houses such as these and thus the dwelling that took place within them cannot be repeated. The example has another role; one dictated by the use of dwelling. Heidegger's point is that dwelling took place.

And yet, even in conceding that dwelling took place what cannot be avoided are the questions - Who dwelt? Who was at home within such a dwelling? Answering these questions might begin with another. Is it the case that it was within the domestic economy of this house that "man" was able to dwell properly? Part of that economy was the positioning of domestic space such that within it "man's" dwelling was effected. The domestic space - the space of this house - was opened up by the fact that it is, to repeat Heidegger's earlier formulation, "... let into the dwelling of man." While more detail may need to be added, it is still clear that what arises here concerns the relationship between dwelling thought essentially and the insistent presence of a domestic economy that was staged by the house. The polemical form of this question is: What is the relationship between dwelling and the domestic economy of patriarchy? In other words, what is being asked for is the nature of the relationship between a domestic economy and Heidegger's claim which has already been noted that "the relationship between man and space is none other than dwelling thought essentially".

Even though it would involve other considerations a similar line of questioning could be brought to the "lecture hall" once it is understood as the enactment of a specific pedagogic economy. At this stage the value of this approach does not lie in the answers that it would generate. What is central is the effect that such a questioning would have on the overall

project. If it is possible to speak - as indeed Heidegger does - of the "I", the "I" who is never just an encapsulated body, then who is this "I" once the hold of a domestic or pedagogic economy comes into play? Moreover is it possible to position this "I" - enabling this "I" to pervade space - without taking the presence of these economies into consideration? It is with these questions that a limit may have been reached. The limit pertains to what can be thought - specifically what it is that can be thought within that approach to dwelling that links such questions, and links them necessarily, to what for Heidegger is the fundamental question, namely the question of Being. Allowing for the body's insistent presence and what this means is allowing it to be present as the site of embodiment, works at this limit.

And yet, it should not be thought that references to the body are absent from Heidegger's writings. A number of passages could be adduced at this point. One of the most significant, precisely because it concerns the general treatment of the "Spatiality of Being-in-the-world", concerns one of the ways a distinction between Dasein and the body is presented in *Being and Time* § 23. Another occurs during a discussion of Aristotle in Heidegger's 1939 paper, 'Von Wesen und Begriff der *fusiō*. Aristoteles *Physik* B, 1'. It is precisely because this second passage recalls the active quality of the jug - not the activity of the jug expressed in terms of its utility but its being as a jug - that it will be pursued in greater detail:

Being a doctor is not the starting point for the realisation of good health, rather being a man is, but only insofar as man is a ζῷον, a living thing that only lives in that it "bodies" (*es leibt*).²⁰

While Heidegger will go on to define the question of being a "man" beyond the hold of the bodily, what is significant in this passage is that the form "*es leibt*" (it bodies) not only allows being a body an active presence, it becomes a conception of embodiment. The passage restricts life to "man" as a "ζῷον". Nonetheless, what it sets in play is a description of that which is proper to the body - namely that it bodies. The move from body to Dasein and thus from man as a ζῷον to man as that which dwells has to be understood as involving a concession that recognises what is proper to bodies is that bodies 'body' while at the same time arguing that what is proper to Dasein occurs in its (Dasein's)

²⁰ GA 9, p. 256. See in addition the excellent discussion of this passage in Christopher R. Long, 'The Hegemony of Form and the Resistance of Matter', *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal*, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 21-47.

differentiation from the bodily. The complex arguments of § 23 of *Being and Time* reiterate this attempt to escape any reduction of Dasein to the bodily. As such the differentiation finds a number of different formulations. In sum, what is always involved is the attempt to define Dasein's spatiality as being necessarily distinct from any spatiality of the body where that spatiality is understood in terms of embodiment. One form in which this possibility is enacted is in terms of the distinction between the "I-thing encumbered with a body" (*das körperbehaftete Ich-ding*) and "concernful Being-in-the-world" (*das besorgende In-der-Welt-sein*). (142/107)

As has already been intimated what is occurring in both of these texts is a twofold move. In the first instance there is the attempt to sustain a fundamental distinction between Dasein and embodied existence. The second concerns what it would mean for there to be a theory of embodiment. Embodiment becomes the activity of the body; it 'bodies'. And yet what is the nature of this body? Whose body is it? While these are legitimate questions - ones that bring the complex determinations of gender and race into consideration - it remains the case that the bodies are always counter posed to Dasein.²¹ What this means is that bodies do not dwell. Dasein dwells but in the impossibility of any reduction of Dasein's being-in-the-world to embodied worldly existence. Once the latter is allowed to be site of a legitimate concern with an authentic worldly existence then the already different status of, for example, male and female bodies would have to be taken into consideration. A shift in the conception of philosophical project would then have to occur.

Given that bodies do not dwell it is important to ask the question again - Who dwells? What counts as an answer to this question is now clearer. What emerged from Heidegger's own examples of the forest hut and the lecture room was that embodied experience has to have been absent from both. In the case of the lecture hall the "I" that was present was not the

²¹ While I pursue the point to different ends here I agree with Edward Casey's argument that "Heidegger ... returns to place not through but despite the body's involvement in placiality; as if place could be reached around and outside the body". (*The Fate of Place* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), p. 244) My difference with Casey is not at all with the acuity of his reading of Heidegger. What is overlooked is the necessity of the interrelationship between the way in which place and body are thought and the overall philosophical project that occasions that thinking. For Casey an argument with the limitations of place does not become the basis for an engagement with the larger philosophical project. It is this which emerges from the way in which the distinction between "humanism" and "man" thought essentially is posed in 'Letter on Humanism' (GA 9, pp. 313-364; BW, pp. 217-265).

embodied presence of the ineliminable differences that make up and therefore define the pedagogical economy. While in the hut dwelling was not domestic. What was "let dwell" had to do with the role of mortals within the "four fold". The point at issue here cannot be reduced to a simple matter of exclusion as though all that were of concern was the failure to confront embodiment. What has to be the point of investigation is the set up in which that exclusion is an effect - albeit a necessary effect. This position has already been presented in terms of a complex structure of spacing, the necessary interrelationship between the the essential, dwelling and "man" and the determining role of the present. What has emerged thus far concerning the role that the body plays, or does not play in answering the question - Who dwells? - has to be incorporated into the set up marking Heidegger's thinking of dwelling.

V.

Who then is the "I" of the lecture hall? Whose body is in question? On one level the answer is clear. In using "I" Heidegger names and identifies his own body. And yet as the passage also makes clear he not just present "as this encapsulated body" (*als dieser abgekapselte Leib*). Integral to the point being made is that the opposition between body and space, such that the body is then understood as 'in' space, is rendered inappropriate. The argument is that subjects (bodies) sustain and create space by their activities. The expression "encapsualted body" is intended to stand as the entity given in the opposition body/space. In contradistinction to this opposition the "I" is positioned as already in space, already there and thus because of that position can then go through that space. Even in accepting these distinctions the question of the subject and thus of its identity returns. Who is the "I" that is not the "encapsulated body" or that cannot be reduced to the "encapsulated body"? These questions cannot be answered except by recognising that this "I" - this subject - is bound up with and thus only explicable in terms of spacing; the activity of spacing that is intrinsic to this subject's being. What is at work here is the twofold determination of spacing that has already been noted.

In order for there to be an "I" that spaces - an "I" incorporated into the activity of spacing - that "I" has to be necessarily distinct from, or a least not reducible to any form of embodied presence. What this means is that this founding differentiation is intrinsic to any account of spacing. The "I" whose body is in the lecture hall becomes the instance of a body spacing and insofar as it is an instance of spacing the "lecture hall" attains

the status of an example. Whether it be a lecture hall, a kitchen, a hospital ward, a bedroom etc., cannot matter. Each one functions as an example and therefore one can always replace the other. (In other words, the force of Heidegger's argument does not depend upon its being a "lecture hall" rather than a kitchen.) The consequence of the founding spacing that allows for spacing is that a return - a philosophical return - cannot be made to the specificity of the lecture hall. It would exist merely on the level of the "encapsulated body"; i.e. the particular whose presence would disclose the truth though always at the cost of the necessary elimination of particularity. In the case of the "lecture hall" it would be that which was essential to spacing. There cannot be anything essential to the "lecture hall" except insofar as it discloses another truth. A similar point can be made in relation to the house in the Black Forest. The point of the example is that the house allowed for a presentation of the possibility that dwelling thought essentially could have some material existence or presence. That the presence occurred in a house such that it would be necessary then to address the particularity of the domestic and thus the ineliminability within that setting of a domestic economy and all that such an economy entailed, would have to be of no real philosophical relevance.

The initial answer to the question - Who dwells? - can at least be given in the negative. The answer is, neither man nor woman. Again, this should not be seen as an oversight that could be corrected by allowing embodiment a place and by defining bodies as *ab initio* gendered. Such a move would be metaphysical; moreover it would, in Heidegger's sense of the term, be a humanism. In the 'Letter on Humanism' the relation between humanism and metaphysics is defined thus:

Every determination of the essence of man (*des Wesens des Menschen*) that already presupposes an interpretation of beings without asking the question of the truth of being, whether knowingly or not, is metaphysical. The result is that what is peculiar to all metaphysics, specifically with respect to the way the essence of man (*das Wesen des Menschen*) is determined, is that it is "humanistic". (GA 9.321; BW 225-6)

Heidegger's point here is that the way in which the question of "man" is defined by metaphysics precludes the positioning of that which is essential to "man". The limits of metaphysics are established in the same text in the following way:

Metaphysics closes itself to the simple essential fact that man essentially occurs only in his essence (*nur in seinem Wesen*), where he is claimed by Being. (GA 9.323; BW 227)

Both these passages argue that the question of "man" can only be posed essentially in relation to Being and secondly that any other way of posing that question - any way, that is, that allows the question to be posed other than in relation to the essential - is either metaphysical or a humanism. In the end of course humanism becomes a version of metaphysics. A concern with embodiment that was thought to be essential to the being of being human would, from this perspective, fail to understand the nature of the essential. In both of the passages cited above the question of "man" is both posed and answered. Man is who he is - is what he is most properly - to the extent that "he is claimed by Being".

With the possible recognition by "man" of his place - "man's" proper place - there would be a repetition of the movement already announced as the "venture in thought" that traces what is back to "that domain to which everything that is belongs". "Man" can become that which is "man's" most properly because this propriety and that which allows for it is "older" than "man's" continual manifestation as self or body. Humanism therefore is not simply counterposed to propriety as though they formed part of a simple opposition. The proper refers to the original set up; one that will always have been older. And yet the domain of the proper is not just older. It structures - spaces - the setting in which the relations between "man" and space and therefore dwelling can in fact be posed. The founding spacing - the spacing proper to this relation - is interarticulated with a temporality presented and thus held by a distinction between the everyday and that which is "older". When it was suggested earlier that Heidegger formulates the present - the time of writing - as that which demands its differentiation from itself, it should now be clear that this differentiation can only take place in the name of that which is "older". While the interplay of an implicit temporality and a founding spacing work to define the setting in which "man" is to be thought, it nonetheless still seems possible - and necessary - to ask who this "man" is.

Asking this question should not to be understood as a refusal of general descriptions. Leaving aside Heidegger's own analysis of Aristotle's formulation, when Aristotle argues that the being of being human is explicable in terms of the human as ζῶον πολιτικόν the automatic move is to allow the different modalities of being-in-the-polis to unfold. Moreover, Aristotle's description brings with it a sense of

propriety that is not linked to the human *qua* human but to the most satisfactory ways in which being-in-the-polis can be realised. (φρονησις and εὐδαιμονία combine to generate a conception of virtue that is integrated into the materiality of everyday life.²²) As such there would always be a movement - more possible than actual in Aristotle's own case - between the being of being human and the materiality of human life. The important point is that there is no philosophical impediment to moving between the general and the material. Moreover, the way in which the general is thought is always in terms of the plurality of its instantiation. While Heidegger is constrained to resist any formulation that involves a distinction between the general and the material one consequence of this resistance is the philosophical impossibility of accounting for the materiality of life (e.g. embodied subjects). Even in the example of the house in the Black Forest in which there is the move to the actuality of building, its realisation is premised on a capability that "we" have though which "we" are yet to realise, i.e. dwelling. (Heidegger is precise: "Only if we are capable of dwelling, only then can we build"). The "we" of the present needs to recognise that founding, "older" we. The question that immediately arises - though it is, of course, the question that continues to arise - is who is this "we".

As has emerged, this "we" is articulated within a conception of the present as "indifferent" to the question of Being, moreover it is a "we" who in living with this "indifference" fails to recognise that which is most properly its. The "we" lives metaphysically. It is a mode of living that is held within the already identified twofold spacing. The body that spaces - the subject as present in the activity of its spacing - is already formulated in terms of a radical divide between Dasein and embodiment. (Here is a further instance of the spacing prior to spacing.) Dasein could only be embodied if the very particularity and detail of embodiment were themselves forgotten. That forgetting, however, is not just the forgetting of the everyday and the ordinary, nor moreover is it just the forgetting of materiality, more significantly it is a necessary forgetting of the ineliminable differences that mark and define that which would come to be formulated in the being of being human.²³ Excluding, through the

²² I have tried to outline some of the issues involved in this interpretation of these terms - in both Aristotle and Sophocles - in my 'Where Philosophy Begins: The Event of Plurality', *Pli: The Warwick Journal of Philosophy* Vol. 8 (1999), pp. 100-119.

²³ Part of the argument is intended to extend what I have developed elsewhere in terms of a "plural event". (See *The Plural Event*, London: Routledge, 1993) The suggestion here is that what emerges at the limit of Heidegger's argument is the necessity to reformulate the being of being human in terms of a complexity that is

movement of either active or passive forgetting, the anoriginal differences within human being, is the inevitable consequence of the way in which "man" is constrained to be thought within Heidegger's project. Any redress can only take place at the limit of that project; a limit at which it becomes necessary to think an ontology of original difference. The complexity within embodiment could provide a beginning for philosophical activity once that complexity is taken as the source of thought rather than that which restricts thought. Philosophy would then be constrained by having to think the insistent originality of that complexity. After the event, therefore, it would have another beginning.

there at the origin. What I have described as "anoriginal complexity". As such, questions of race and gender and other ways in which embodiment is complicated would not be seen as predicates or additions to the body but as integral to the body from the very start. What is needed therefore is a philosophical thinking that allows for this conception of the body. There are many ways in which this undertaking could be accomplished. The implicit suggestion here is that what is needed is the retention of an ontology that allows for original difference such that an ontology of the body is one that allows for and thus gives expression to anoriginal difference.