

Deleuzian 'Becomings' and Leibnizian Transubstantiation

MOGENS LAERKE

When trying to comprehend Gilles Deleuze's 'geophilosophy' one of the most pertinent problems is to determine the nature of the so called 'becomings' (becoming-woman, becoming-animal, becoming-imperceptible, etc.), as they are described in especially *A Thousand Plateaus*, *Kafka. Pour une littérature mineure* and *Dialogues*.¹ It is well known to any reader of Deleuze that the affirmation of 'becomings' is closely connected to a Nietzscheo-Spinozistic ethics of making the body go to the limits of its abilities and even to transgress these limits.² In Deleuze's work, 'becomings' are assimilated to the movement of deterritorialization, that is, to the lines of flight crossing the borders of the stratified and organized regions of existence into the fundamental ontological disorganization of the 'Body without Organs' underlying and surrounding every stratification. However, if this produces the ethical imperative of affirming 'becomings', it does not give any specifications of the function or the possibility of 'becomings'.

Most often Deleuze explains 'becomings' by what they are not. There are three recurring determinations of this kind. First, 'becoming' is an *individuation without a subject*.³ 'Becomings' are not to be understood in terms of metempsychosis; it is not a subject that becomes another subject. Second, 'becomings' cannot be achieved by imitation,⁴ but only through a

tentative experimentation with the body *vis-à-vis* another body.⁵ Finally, Deleuze insists that the so-called 'nomadic' movements identified with 'becomings' do not imply movements in space. Nomadic movements are not movements in extension, but rather intensive movements.⁶ one can take flight from the territory without moving an inch.⁷ But it is still a figure of transformation that remains somewhat obscure.

A similar rejection of metempsychosis or transmigration of souls is frequently repeated by one of Deleuze's primary inspirations: Leibniz.⁸ It may then appear strange that in Leibniz's late letters to the Jesuit father Bartholomew des Bosses one will find an effort to give a metaphysical account for the Catholic transubstantiation by the means of a theory of a so called *vinculum substantiale*.⁹ As in the case of Deleuze's 'becomings', in these letters we are also confronted with an effort to account for substantial transformations of a given individual without making reference to metempsychosis (Christ does not take the place of the soul of the bread) or to changes in appearance of a given fixed subject as in natural transformation (the bread does not look like Christ). Moreover, the Eucharist is seen as an operation without a subject as established not only by Leibniz, but also by St. Thomas.¹⁰ These similarities between Deleuze's descriptions of 'becomings' and the Leibnizian conceptualization of the Eucharist, make me suspect that this last one might shed some light on the first.¹¹ I shall then in the following

p. 40.

⁵ Cf. Dia.: p. 59; Kaf.: p. 64, p. 111.

⁶ Cf. Dia. p. 62; Kaf.: p. 24, p. 40 ff.

⁷ Cf. Dia., p. 48 ff.

⁸ Cf. Leibniz: *Système nouveau de la nature* (Flammarion, Paris 1994), p. 68 ff. *La monadologie* (Gallimard, Paris 1995), §72; *Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain* (Flammarion, Paris 1990), book I, chap. I, and book II, chap. XXVII, § 6; *Principes de la nature et de la grâce* (Flammarion, Paris 1996), p. 227 ff.; Letter to Arnauld 30. April 1687 in *Lettres de Leibniz à Arnauld* (PUF, Paris 1952), p. 72. Letters to Des Bosses, 16. October 1706, 24. April 1709, transl. in Frémont, C.: *L'être et la relation* (Vrin, Paris 1981), p. 101 ff., p. 129.

⁹ The correspondance runs from 1706 until 1716, where it is interrupted by Leibniz's death. All important letters from Leibniz to Des Bosses are translated from Latin into French in Frémont, op.cit.

¹⁰ Cf. Frémont, op. cit., p. 45.

¹¹ One might object to such a cross reading the fact that *A Thousand Plateaus*, being Deleuze's most elaborate work on 'becomings', doesn't contain one single reference to Leibniz. Against this objection it should be noted that Deleuze's seminars at Université de Paris VIII-St. Denis in the publishing year of *A Thousand Plateaus* (1981) were entirely devoted to Leibniz, something which can hardly be coincidental and which testifies to Leibniz's permanent virtual presence in Deleuze's philosophy.

¹ Deleuze, G. / Guattari, F.: *A Thousand Plateaus* (Univ. of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis/London, 1987); Deleuze, G. /Guattari, F.: *Kafka. Pour une littérature mineure* (Minuit, Paris 1975); Deleuze, G. /Parnet, C.: *Dialogues* (Flammarion, Paris 1996) Hereafter referred to as TP., Kaf. and Dia.

² TP.: p. 256 ff.; Dia.: pp. 74-76.

³ Cf. Dia., p. 51; Kaf. 65.

⁴ Cf. TP.: p. 233 ff.; p. 258; p. 274 ff.; p. 305, and Dia.: p. 8; p. 56; p. 62; Kaf.: p. 25,

attempt to give an account of how the vocabularies of Deleuze and of Leibniz intertwine and resonate.¹² This I will do by showing how Leibniz's account of the *substantiation* of composed bodies by virtue of the *vinculum substantiale* finds equivalent categories in Deleuze's descriptions of what he calls a *stratification* or a *territorialization*. Finally, I will demonstrate how Leibniz's efforts to make *trans*-substantiation intelligible manifest startling resemblances to the ways in which Deleuze conceptualizes the functions of mutual *de*-territorialization and 'becomings'.

Intensive bodies in Deleuze and Leibniz

The theory of the *vinculum substantiale* constitutes the most elaborate effort on the part of Leibniz to account for the particularity of the organic body and to solve pertinent problems in his understanding of the relation between the body and the soul. In order to understand exactly what the *vinculum* is, it is then essential to have an idea of the general framework within which Leibniz conceptualizes the body. Leibniz has two ways of doing this, one physical and another metaphysical.¹³

A physical body is an extended thing in time and space. However, according to Leibniz, extension is only given in the perception of each individual monad, and does not have objective reality. That is why a physical body is a mere phenomenon, although it is a *phenomenon bene fundatum*, since the perceptions in each of the monads are 'well-ordered dreams' perfectly coordinated in relation to each other by preestablished harmony.¹⁴ This is the way Leibniz explains the union of the body and the soul in *Système nouveau de la nature*. Following this theory, body and soul are united by a simple parallelism. Accordingly, the correspondence between the body and the soul is just a special case of the general harmony between mind and matter as illustrated by Leibniz's famous

¹² Deleuze has his own reading of Leibniz' theory of the *vinculum substantiale* in *Le pli. Leibniz et le Baroque* (Paris 1988), p. 148 ff. (hereafter simply *Le pli*). Insofar as this reading is not explicitly traceable in Deleuze before *Le pli*, and therefore not in his conceptualizations of 'becomings', references to *Le pli* in the following must be taken with precaution.

¹³ For an elaborate discussion of this 'major disjunction' in Leibniz's way of understanding the body, see Robinet, A.: *Architectonique disjonctive, automates systémiques et idéalité transcendantale dans l'œuvre de G. W. Leibniz* (Vrin, Paris 1986).

¹⁴ Cf. *Système nouveau de la nature*, op. cit., p. 73-74.

metaphor of the two perfectly synchronized watches.

In the phenomenal context, the time and space in which extended things are situated, are only derivative functions of the relative positions between extended things and pure beings of the imagination.¹⁵ However, moving from physics to metaphysics, from phenomena to monads, the 'space' in which the body is conceptualized changes profoundly. Here the body is an aggregate of monads.¹⁶ Such an aggregate is a set of monads, active expressive forces assimilated to the scholastic *haecceities*, all of which are expressing the world from a particular point of view.¹⁷ We are no longer contemplating imaginary extensive space as deployed in perception *from* a particular point of view, but instead we are contemplating the order *of* points of view on the world, a purely ideal *spatium of intermonadic relations*.¹⁸ Here, Leibniz explains, the body is the monads that are expressed as 'closest' to the soul [French: *plus prochainement*].¹⁹ However, a distance in the intermonadic order cannot be measured in extensive space, because extensive space is purely imaginary.²⁰ As Leibniz puts it himself:

[S]pace becomes the order of coexistent phenomena, as time becomes that of successive phenomena; and there are for the monads no spatial or absolute proximity or distance, and to say that they are collected in a point or spread out in space, is fictions of our spirit, because we would like to imagine the things that can only be conceived.²¹

How then should the 'closeness' of a body to the soul, to which it belongs, be understood? Every monad expresses, perceives and contains the entire world. This is a part of its self-sufficiency as a substance. Each individual substance does not, however, express the entire world with the same clarity or with the same intensity. Each of them only expresses clearly a small 'neighbourhood', this clear zone of expression defining its

¹⁵ Cf. Leibniz's correspondence with Clarke, *passim*.

¹⁶ Cf. *La monadologie*, op. cit. § 2; *Nouveaux essais...*, op. cit., chap. XXIV, § 1.

¹⁷ Cf. ex. Leibniz: *Discours de métaphysique* (Gallimard, Paris 1995), art. VIII.

¹⁸ I follow here the presentation of the ideal domain of intermonadic relations as presented by Deleuze in his lecture on Leibniz 12/5-1987 (on web page <http://www.imaginet.deleuze>).

¹⁹ Cf. *Système nouveau de la nature*, op. cit., p. 73.

²⁰ Cf. Rutherford, D.: *Leibniz and the rational order of nature* (Cambridge University Press 1995), pp. 219-221 and pp. 248-53.

²¹ Letter to Des Bosses 16. June 1712 in Frémont, op. cit., p.171 (my transl.).

individual notion.²² This clear zone of expression defines the *situs* of a monad in the order of points of view, from which we can also deduce what a *distance* between *situses* implies: it is a difference in the intensity with which two monads express a particular part of the world. It is in this type of order or relational *spatium* that an aggregate of monads must be understood. For example, the monads of my hand do not belong to my body because the hand is a part of the extended thing given to me in perception as my body. They belong to me because the clear zone of expression of the monad 'I' prolongs itself in such a way, that there is only an infinitesimal jump to the clear perceptive series in the hand, which allows the soul-monad 'I' to *express the immediate cause* of the clear perceptions in the hand-monad. I am not the cause of my hand's perceptions, only the hand is cause of its perceptions, but I *express* the immediate cause of my hands perceptions more *intensely* than the hand does it itself, and by this it is said to be close to me and to belong to me. In this sense the coordinates of distance and subordination are a function of the differences in perfection and intensity of expression in the monads involved.²³ This is why the intermonadic *spatium* can be conceptualized as *intensive*, and a bodily aggregate as an intensive composite.

According to Leibniz, there are two types of bodily aggregates. On the one hand there are the inorganic aggregates, like a heap of stones or a flock of sheep, in which all the elements enter into the aggregate on equal terms. Such aggregates are mere beings of reason and only *unum per accidens*.²⁴ On the other hand there are the organic aggregates distinguished by having a singular dominant monad governing a series of subordinated monads. The dominated monads enter the aggregate as what Leibniz terms the *requisites* of the dominant monad's body. This hierarchical structure of subordination and requisition makes the aggregate an organized one and *unum per se*.²⁵ Leibniz terms such an

²² Cf. *La monadologie*, op. cit., § 57 and § 60.

²³ Cf. *La monadologie*, op. cit., § 62, *Discours de métaphysique*, op. cit., art. XV-XVI. See also Letter to Arnauld 28 Nov./8. Dec. 1686, op. cit., p. 53. For a more detailed discussion, see Rutherford, op.cit., p. 244 ff. and Look, B.: "Leibniz and the 'vinculum substantiale'", *Studio leibnitiana*, Sonderheft 30 (Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 1999), p. 39 ff.

²⁴ Leibniz: Letter to Des Bosses 11. March 1706, in Frémont, op. cit., p. 84.

²⁵ Cf. *La monadologie*, op.cit., § 70. *Principes de la nature et de la grâce*, op. cit. p. 224. Fragment *De la nature des corps et de la force motrice*, 1702, in *Système nouveau...*, op. cit., p. 177. Cf. also Letter to Arnauld 28. Nov./8. Dec. 1686, op. cit. p. 54 ff. and Letter to Des Bosses 11. March 1706, in Frémont, op. cit., p. 84. Cf. also *Le pli*, p. 152.

organized aggregate a *composed substance*.

At this point striking resemblances to Deleuze appear. Similarly, in *A Thousand Plateaus*, when Deleuze and Guattari speak of a body, they conceptualize it as a molar aggregate composed of intensive molecules, primary expressive forces also referred to as *haecceities*:

A degree, an intensity, is an individual, a *Haecceity* that enters into composition with other degrees, other intensities, to form another individual.²⁶

This is our hypothesis: a multiplicity is defined not by the elements that compose it in extension, not by the characteristics that compose it in comprehension, but by the lines and dimensions it encompasses in 'intension.'²⁷

A singular body is a local organization of intensities on the 'Body without Organs' coordinated in relation to each other in a quasi-stable form giving rise to a singular body *with* organs; a stratified 'programmed' body or a 'territorialization'. As was the case for the Leibnizian composed substance a body is an organized intensive multiplicity, which Deleuze calls a 'haecceity assemblage'. Also the hierarchy of dominant and subordinated monads in the Leibnizian composed substance organizes intensities in a way very close to the arborescent centralized structures invoked by Deleuze when describing the conditions of a stratification on the 'Body without Organs': "If we ask the general question, 'What holds things together?', the clearest, easiest answer seems to be provided by a formalizing, linear, hierarchized, centralized *arborescent* model".²⁸ In both instances it concerns a hierarchy of individuals which conditions the stability and unity of a larger composed individual.

The *vinculum substantiale* and the stratified body

Within the framework of *La Monadologie*, however, it is very hard to see with which force a dominant monad can exert this power of unification, insofar as the monads have no windows: no monad can cause anything to happen in another monad. The Jesuit P.P. Tournemine was the first to

²⁶ TP, p. 245.

²⁷ TP, p. 253.

²⁸ TP, p. 327.

recognize this problem in the system of pre-established harmony. In his critique of Leibniz he points out that a simple correspondence or harmony between the soul and the body cannot constitute a real union between them.²⁹ It is this problem that the theory of the *vinculum substantiale* is an effort to solve. The *vinculum substantiale*, the substantial bond, is a relation holding together the monads of which a body is metaphysically composed. A substantial bond is a local structure. It adheres only to a limited part of the global order of monads, exactly the part 'I' call 'my' body.³⁰ The substantial bonds are essentially identical to the ideal intermonadic relations of pre-established harmony, but a substantial bond 'repeats', or as Leibniz puts it, 'echoes' or is superposed upon a local area of pre-established harmony. By this superposition of harmony a local area, the body, gains a certain consistency or reality.³¹ In an extraordinary reading of the Des Bosses correspondence, Christiane Frémont puts it in the following manner:

The substantial bond is a particular path traced on the graph of the Harmony, a specific relation between certain monads, in no way necessary and universal, but contingent and particular. The Bond is the very existence of an inter-expression [*entr'expression*] between certain monads so strong that they produce a specific union, the composed substance: the body. What is the substantial bond? It is the specification and materialization of the Harmony: the incarnation.³²

The *vinculum* differs existentially from pre-established harmony by being real and not ideal, but it is *essentially* identical to it. This is why it does not interfere in pre-established harmony. This is also the reason why the *vinculum* does not change anything in the monads involved, their

²⁹ Cf. P.P. Tournemine, "Conjectures sur l'union de l'âme et du corps." in *Mémoires de Trévoux*, may 1703, art. XCI. Leibniz first answer to Tournemine's critique is published in *Mémoires de Trévoux*, march 1708, art. XXXV. Here Leibniz recognizes the problem, but insists on the incapacity of the human understanding to conceive of a 'metaphysical union' of the soul and the body should such a union exist. A proper answer to Tournemine's critique does not appear until the Des Bosses correspondence. For the Tournemine debate, see appendices in Leibniz: *Système nouveau...*, op. cit., p. 151 f. Cf. also Rutherford, op.cit., p. 273 ff.

³⁰ Cf. also *Le pli*, p. 152.

³¹ Letter to Des Bosses 29. April 1715. See also letter 29. May 1716 in Frémont, op. cit. p. 193 and p. 206.

³² Cf. Frémont, op. cit. p. 55 (my transl.).

perceptions remaining the same no matter whether the *vinculum* is there or not. As Leibniz says: "The unity of the corporeal substance in [a] horse does not result from a refraction of the monads, but from the superposition [latin: *superadditum*] of a substantial bond, that changes absolutely nothing in the monads themselves".³³

One might say that the *vinculum* assures the permanence of an individual body by 'holding on to' and organizing the subordinated monads that it requires to have a body. However, dominated monads are not tied to the dominant monad. The dominated monads can always be exchanged for other monads taking up the same position *vis-à-vis* the dominant monad in question. In fact, Leibniz always describes the domain of *dominata* as very agitated, monads perpetually going in and out of domination, entering under the *vinculum* merely as requisites *pro tempore*.³⁴ If a dominant monad loses its requisites it 'implicates' or loses corporeal existence, although the dominant monad remains as a living soul. This 'implication' of the monad, when it loses its *dominata*, Leibniz terms 'death', and it only refers to a loss of the body.³⁵ The requisites constitute a turbulent mass or flux of monads passing in and out of domination, the preservation of the body being a function of a certain equilibrium in the influx of monads.³⁶ It is exactly this equilibrium that the *vinculum substantiale* maintains. The *unum per se* of the composed substance then differs from the *unum per accidens* of the simple *ens per aggregationem* by its stability or ability to recreate itself.

Again resonances to Deleuze appears. The *vinculum* gives a certain consistency to the organic body by capturing and organizing monads in the same way that a stratification for Deleuze is an 'apparatus of capture' that 'locks' the intensities in which it effectuates itself.³⁷ Moreover, Deleuze conceptualizes the conditions of a stratification through something very close to an echo, namely a 'refrain'. As the *vinculum substantiale* superposes itself upon global harmony, a stratification is a local 'thickening' of the plane of the Body without Organs constituted by 'overcoding' and by 'resonance and redundancy'.³⁸ Moreover, Deleuze

³³ Letter to Des Bosses. 16. June 1712, in Frémont, op. cit., p. 172 (my transl.).

³⁴ Cf. Letters to Des Bosses, 11. March 1706, 24. April 1709, 23. August 1713, in Frémont, op. cit. p. 83 f.; p. 129; p. 188 and *Nouveaux essais...*, op. cit., chap. XXVII, § 6.

³⁵ *La monadologie*, op. cit., § 73 and *Principes de la nature et de la grâce*, op. cit., pp. 227-28.

³⁶ *La monadologie*, op. cit., § 71.

³⁷ TP., p. 40.

³⁸ TP., p. 262, TP. p. 40.

invokes a superposition of planes to describe how a stratification gains the consistency through which it succeeds to hold together the intensities it organizes:

In a general sense, we call a refrain any aggregate of matters of expression that draws a territory and develops into territorial motifs and landscapes [...]. The first question to be asked is what holds these territorializing marks, territorial motifs, and territorialized functions together in the same intra-assemblage. This is the question of consistency: the "holding together" of heterogeneous elements [...]. Consistency is the same as consolidation, it is the act that produces consolidated aggregates, of succession as well as of coexistence, by means of the three factors just mentioned: intercalated elements, intervals, and articulations of superposition.³⁹

What is the limit of a *vinculum* insofar as it is local? As Christiane Frémont has pointed out, the 'reality' or force of a bonding is determined gradually as a function of the distance from the dominated monad to the monads that it is dominating.⁴⁰ On the borders of each bonded multiplicity there are 'untied' monads tending to leave the *vinculum*. Such 'marginal' or non-bonded monads are 'semi-beings', as Leibniz terms them, or 'non-bonded monads' that 'escape domination' as Deleuze himself puts it in his book on Leibniz, *Le pli. Leibniz et le Baroque*.⁴¹ The same goes for the stratification, which is a somewhat 'fuzzy aggregate' according to Deleuze and Guattari.⁴² Every stratified multiplicity has a border, where there are nomad singularities tending to leave the strata. These are no longer the 'assemblage haecceities' serving as requisites in the stratification, but 'anomalies' or 'interassemblage haecceities' moving in the interstices between different stratifications on 'the cutting edge of deterritorialization'.⁴³ Non-bonded monads in Leibniz, or nomad singularities in Deleuze, are then 'distant' from the dominant monad, on

³⁹ Cf. TP., pp. 323-29. See also p. 311 ff. p. 313.

⁴⁰ Cf. Frémont, op. cit. p. 60-61.

⁴¹ Letter to Des Bosses 19. August 1715, in Frémont, op. cit., p. 197 and *Le pli*, op.cit., p. 156.

⁴² Cf. TP., p. 344 f., p. 407.

⁴³ Cf. TP., p. 234-36, p. 262. Dia., p. 54. Also in *Foucault* Deleuze talks about "singularities of resistance, able to [...] change the unstable diagram" or "savage singularities, not yet bonded, on the line of the outside itself" (Deleuze, G.: *Foucault* (Mimuit, Paris 1986), p. 130).

the margins of domination. But one has to recall here, that distance in the intermonadic domain is a function of the ability of one monad to express clearly the immediate cause of another. This is why the distance involved does not imply that an un-bonded monad is spatially distant from the dominant monad and the *vinculum*, but only that their clear zones of expression do not converge; the dominant monad cannot express clearly the immediate causes of the perceptions in the un-bonded monads. A distance or un-bonding of monads may then be constituted on the spot as it was also the case with the 'lines of flight' or 'becomings' in Deleuze.

Transubstantiation and 'becomings'

According to Leibniz, the flux of requisite monads moving in and out of domination in the organic body gives an account of natural transformation; of the metaphysical implications of life, death, deterioration and birth, etc. However, all this is seen from the perspective of the dominant monad in the composed substance. From here, the *vinculum* itself always remains the same, the structure of the *vinculum* being very closely connected to what the dominant monad requires to have a body.⁴⁴ One might, however, reverse the perspective and look at it from the point of view of the flow of requisites. From their perspective leaving the *vinculum* is a gradual passage towards domination under another *vinculum*. If the *vinculum* from the 'major' molar perspective of the dominant monad is fixed, then, on the contrary, seen from the 'minor', molecular perspective of the *dominata*, the *vinculum* is in a certain sense exchangeable. It is true that the entire aggregate of monads of an organism cannot enter under a new *vinculum* all at once by natural means. Leibniz insists that in natural transformation such a change cannot occur instantaneously and completely.⁴⁵ However, one might conceive of a gradual replacement of the *vinculum* by following, not the dominant monad, but the monads in flux, taking the 'minor perspective'.

This brings us from the domain of substantiation of composed bodies to the domain of transubstantiation. Such a change is what happens in the Eucharist according to Leibniz: the monads of the bread becomes detached from the *vincula* defining the bread, and enter instead under the

⁴⁴ Cf. Letter to Des Bosses 23. August 1713 and 29. April 1715, in Frémont, op.cit. p. 188 and p. 193.

⁴⁵ Cf. Letter to Des Bosses 4. October 1706, in Frémont, op.cit., p. 98, and *La monadologie*, op. cit., § 72.

vinculum of the body of Christ.

The monads of the body of Christ has been held back [...] and the substantial bond of Christ has received from God the function to substantially unify the monads of the bread and the wine. But the former bond has been destroyed, and along with it the modifications or accidents proper to it.⁴⁶

The Eucharist is the limit case, and is therefore supernatural. It is where an immediate and complete change of *vinculum substantiale* occurs.⁴⁷ This, however, does not mean that the phenomena of the bread changes: the bread does not look like Christ, the transubstantiation being far from a mere act of imitation. The bread still looks like bread. It is not the series of perceptions that changes, neither in the dominant monad, nor in the dominated monads. The monads leaving the *vinculum* are not reconfigured in their internal principle taken separately, nothing changing in their perceptions, but their clear zones of expression are configured otherwise *in relation to each other* so as to have their *common cause* expressed clearly by another dominant monad. It is no longer the bread monad that expresses the common cause of the perceptions given in the multiplicity of subordinated monads, but the subordinated monads are reorganized in a different order in which it would be the monad 'Christ' that would express clearly the common cause of their perceptions. It is in this sense that the body of Christ can be said to be really present in the Eucharist.

The same is the case with the Deleuzian 'becomings'. *A Thousand Plateaus* provides a series of examples where the similarities are particularly striking. There is a becoming-horse of a masochist who demands to be treated like a horse, making an intensive exchange where "one series [the horse's affects] explodes into the other [the masochist's affects], forms a circuit with it: an increase in power or a circuit of intensities".⁴⁸ Or another masochist example of a woman, who in her domination program lists a series of stitchings sewing up her body openings.⁴⁹ In *Dialogues* one will find somewhat controversial

⁴⁶ Letter to Des Bosses 20. September 1712, in Frémont, op.cit., p. 176 (my transl.). See also Letter to Des Bosses, 5. February 1712, p. 161-62.

⁴⁷ Cf. Letter to Des Bosses 23. August, 1713, in Frémont, op.cit. p. 188. See also Robinet, A.: *Architectonique disjonctive...*, op. cit., p. 90 f.

⁴⁸ TP, p. 156.

⁴⁹ Cf. TP., pp. 156-57 and TP., p. 151. For other determinations of 'masochism' as being of the order of 'becomings', see Deleuze, G.: "Re-présentation de Masoch" in

determinations of anorexia as being a strategy of resistance or a line of flight, in short, of the order of 'becomings'.⁵⁰ And, finally, a passage from William Burroughs' *Naked Lunch*, quoted in *A Thousand Plateaus*:

The human body is scandalously inefficient. Instead of a mouth and an anus to get out of order why not an all-purpose hole to eat and to eliminate? We could seal up nose and mouth, fill in the stomach, make an airhole direct into the lungs where it should have been in the first place.⁵¹

What all these examples have in common, is that they imply an experimentation with the organization of the body, so as to give a particular part of the body an operative function different from the one prescribed by its initial organization. The masochist does not look like a horse, but reconfigures his body parts and their functions and laws in relation to each other in such a way, that they would have 'a horse' as their common cause. This is exactly like putting body under a different *vinculum* as in the Leibnizian Eucharist, making it possible to understand a 'becoming' in the vocabulary of Leibniz: a 'becoming' is an anomalous reconfiguration of subordinated monads tending to leave the *vinculum*, an anomaly that results in a change in the *common cause* of these 'nomad monads', a change which makes them become another body.

Conclusion

What is the conceptual output of thinking territorializations in terms of substantiations, nomadic movements in terms of the migrational flux of requisites under the *vinculum*, and Deleuzian 'becomings' as comparable to the Leibnizian account of the Eucharist? We have listed above three somewhat 'negative' determinations through which Deleuze conceptualized 'becomings'. They 1) didn't have a subject; 2) weren't imitative; 3) didn't imply movements in space. What the transposition into the Leibnizian vocabulary can provide are positive explanations of these negative determinations.

Concerning the last of these, the conceptualization of 'becomings'

Critique et clinique (Minuit, Paris 1993), p. 71-74.

⁵⁰ Dia., p. 132 f. For similar remarks on anorexia in the case of Kafka, see Kaf., p. 35 f., p. 54.

⁵¹ TP., p. 150.

within the notional *spatium* of intermonadic relations makes it comprehensible how the maps in Deleuzian geophilosophy are drawn according to intensive distances and not according to extensive spatial distances. As extensive space is only a derivative of the relative positions between phenomena given in perception and has nothing to do with intermonadic relations, a becoming cannot have anything to do with movements in space. 'Becomings' only concern a reconfiguration of *inter*-monadic relations, and in no case a change in the *intra*-monadic series, that is, in the series of perceived phenomena in the monads.

This leads us directly to the second determination, the lack of imitation. Because an imitation implies that a phenomena 'looks like', or is perceived as similar to, another phenomena. But as a 'becoming' only concerns intermonadic relations and does not change anything in perception, it cannot be a matter of imitation, but only of how intensities and expressive zones are configured in relation to each other.

Thirdly, in understanding a Deleuzian stratification as similar to the substantiation of composed substances in Leibniz, we get a precise image of how a stratification operates as an apparatus of capture through which a dominant subject fills its requirement of a body by organizing a flux of individuals entering under its *vinculum* as requisites *pro tempore*: by the *vinculum* or the stratification a dominant subject imposes upon dominated subjects that they express the dominant subject as their common cause. It is in this way that the dominant subject acquires a body and becomes real. Inversely, the connection between 'becomings' and the Eucharist gives us an explanation of why a 'becoming-other' necessarily must take the form of an experimentation with the body and cannot have a fixed subject. Because the 'subject' of a body, that is the dominant monad, cannot be detached from the *vinculum*, which means that all movements in relation to the *vinculum* must be seen from the perspective of the requisites of the subject, in trying to follow how the body is individuated as it leaves the 'subject'. Here, a becoming can be understood as a change in the expression of the common cause of requisites as they leave the body. A deterritorialization is denying a dominant monad the incorporation it requires, leaving it to its own perceptive hallucinations, since it no longer expresses the common cause of anything but itself.

These three Leibnizian 'positivations' of Deleuze's statements concerning the nature of 'becomings' outline the immediate conceptual, and at this level still rather abstract, outcome of this particular comparison. Certainly, the analogy does have its limitations, primarily concerning the *will* which regulates the constitution and changes in the vincular configurations of monads: in Leibniz, this will is that of a

benevolent God regulating these changes according to pre-established harmony, whereas in Deleuze the will is assimilated to the dice throw of the eternal return drawing orders of singularities from a far from harmonic 'chaosmos' of singularities according to a principle of pure chance.⁵² It is, however, without giving any examples of a more concrete character, quite clear how this exchange between vocabularies opens up a variety of possibilities for, as well rethinking the formal function of, 'becomings' as for understanding the heritage of this conceptual figure.

Taking a broader methodological perspective, the above is only an example of how the establishment of connections between Deleuze's philosophy and classical rationalist metaphysics in its exchanges with the scholastics of the same period, discussions well known to Deleuze,⁵³ may serve to clarify his philosophical system. Deleuze is often considered a somewhat 'obscure' thinker taking part of a 'postmodern' tradition. However, the fact is that much of the obscurity in Deleuze seems to vanish as soon as his thinking is situated in immediate relation to a completely other philosophical paradigm than the so called 'post-modern' one, namely in relation to classical metaphysics. In order to bestow on Deleuze's philosophy the systematic clarity it possesses, I believe it has to be considered as what it is, namely a systematic and coherent metaphysics in the tradition of the seventeenth century adapted to modern times: "It is Leibniz, I think, who was the first to identify system and philosophy. In the sense that he does it, I adhere to it. Also the questions of 'the surmounting of philosophy', of 'the death of philosophy', never touched me. I feel like a very classical philosopher."⁵⁴

⁵² Cf. *Le pli*, p. 111 and p. 188.

⁵³ Cf. in particular *Spinoza et le problème de l'expression* (Paris 1968) and the central references establishing connections between Spinoza, Duns Scotus and Suarez. Cf. also *Le pli*, op.cit, p. 149, note 21 referring to A. Boehm's exposition of the scholastic sources to Leibniz' theory of the *vinculum*.

⁵⁴ Deleuze, G., *préface* to Martin, Jean-Clet: *Variations* (Paris 1993), p. 7 (my translation).